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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As 'MARKED BY DEcIsioNs SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADMINISTRATION.
In Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 65 Atl. I6, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in an opinion by Chief Jus-
Presumption tice Mitchell gives a very interesting discussion
of Death of the act of June 24, I885 (P. L. 155), pro-
viding for the administration of the estate of persons who
have been absent from the state for seven years. The act
is held constitutional, and the court decides that where ad-
ministration under it had been taken upon the estate of a
woman presumed to be dead in consequence of absence and
she subsequently returned, she could not have dower assigned
to her from the land of which her husband had died seized
when payment in discharge of such dower interest had
already been made to the administrator appointed. Com-
pare with this case Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, and
De-lin v. Commonwealth, ioi Pa. 273.
ADULTERY.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in State v.
Sinipson, 45 S. E. 567, that the fact that a woman has been
Conviction acquitted of adultery with a certain man does
of Man: not prevent that man from being found guilty of
Acquittal adultery with her on the same charge. This
of Woman somewAat anomalous result is reached because
the principal evidence against the man consisted of admis-
sions made by himself which were inadmissible against the
woman. The result is particularly striking in view of the
fact that under the practice in North Carolina the man and
woman were indicted together. One judge dissents.
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BAI LMENTS.
The Suprcme Court of Kansas holds in Coppedge v. Goetz
Bre.wing Co.. 73 Pac. 9o8. that where an action by a bailor
Illegal Use of for damages for the destruction of saloon fix-
Goods tures and furniture did not involve an alleged
transaction between plaintiff and the bailee for the use of
such fixtures for the illegal sale of liquor, the fact that the
bailment was for the purpose of enabling the bailee to carry
on such business illegally was no defence. Compare Falk v.
Brezcqng Co., io Kans. App. 248.
BANKRUPTCY.
Under the bankruptcy act of 1898, providing that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all prova-
DIscharge: ble debts, except, among others, judgments in
Judgment In actions for wilful and malicious injury to the
51ander person of another, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky holds that a judgment in slander is, under the com-
mon law definition, an injury to the person, and within the
bankruptcy act: Sanderson v. Hunt, 76 S. W. 179.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE.
A parent is not liable to his son's fiancee for advising and
inducing him to break his contract to marry her: Appellate
Llabllity of Court of Indiana (Division No. i) in Leonard
Parents v. Wlhetstone, 68 N. E. 198. Where the parents
of plaintiff's intended husband induced him to break his con-
tract by false and slanderous charges made against the plain-
tiff, the plaintiff's only remedy against such parents was, it
is decided, an action for slander.
CARRIERS.
In Penn v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 45 S. E. 563, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that a railroad com-
Obligation to pany owes to a passenger not only the duty of
Passenger protecting him from the assaults of others, but
also owes to him the duty of warning him, when in the act
of alighting, of the dangers arising from persons armed with
pistols engaging in an altercation immediately after having
left the train at a station.
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CONFESSIONS.
In Coinznonwealth v. Antaya, 68 N. E. 331, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that where, on a trial
Admissibility for crime, a confession of defendant 
is offered
in evidence, the question whether it is voluntary
is in the first instance for the presiding judge, but after its
admission the'jury may disregard it if they are not satisfied
that it is voluntary. See also Conmnonwealh v. Reagan,
175 Mass. 335.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A law making it unlawful to refuse admission to any opera
house, theatre, race course, or any place of public amusement
Police to any person over twenty-one years of age who
Regulations presents a ticket of admission, and providing that
any person so refused -admission shall be entitled to recover
his actual damages and $ioo in addition thereto, is held a
valid regulation by the Supreme Court of California in
Grecuberg v. Western Turf. Assn, 73 Pac. io5o.
CONTRACTS.
The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Medart Patent Pul-
ley Co. v. Dubuque, &c., Co.., 96 N. W. 770, that where plain-
Breach: tiff agreed to furnish certain machinery within
Waiver a fixed time but failed to perform its contract in
time, and defendant accepted the same when subsequently
tendered, the fact of defendant's acceptance was not in itself
a waiver of its rights to demand damages for the delay which
it could insist on in reduction of the contract price. Compare
with this case Fraser v. Ross, 41 Atl. 2o4.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
Edwards v. Slate, 68 N. E. 342, that where a servant, who
Anticipatory has entered into a written agreement with her
Breach: master to serve him as housekeeper during his
Right of
Action lifetime in consideration of a legacy to be left her
by the master, is unjustifiably discharged by the master, she
can maintain an action during the master's lifetime to recover
damages for being deprived of her board and lodging and
right to earn the legacy. Compare Daniels v. Newton, I14
Mass. 530.
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
The New York Supreme Court (Special Term, New York
County) holds in American Law Books Co. v. Edward
Unlawful Thompson Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 225, that where
Competition defendant fraudulently induced persons dealing
with complainant to break their contract for the purchase of
complainant's books, for the intended benefit of defendant
and to the intended injury of complainant, and defendant
agreed to indemnify any of complainant's subscribers against
claim for damages for their breach of contract in declining
to receive and pay for complainant's books, and for conduct-
ing and defraying the expenses of the defence of any actions
brought against such subscribers by defendant for breach of
such contracts, complainant was entitled to an injunction
restraining defendant from making such agreements.
In Norris v. Crowe, 55 At]. I 125, it appeared that an
owner, under threat of payment of the principal, agreed to
Cancellation: reduce a ground-rent from six to five per cent.
Mistake of Both of the parties were ignorant at the time of
Law a decision of the State Supreme Court that such
a ground-rent as was in question was an irredeemable one.
On a bill brought by the owner of the ground-rent to cancel
the agreement for mistake of law it was held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania that equity will not grant relief.
However, it is suggested that notwithstanding the mistake
is one of law the plaintiff has a good cause of action to
recover at law according to the original agreement. See
Wilson v. Ott, 173 Pa. 253.
CORPORATIONS.
A statute in New Jersey provides that if a corporation pay
dividends which have not been earned in net profits the
Injunction directors shall be liable to the corporation and
against its creditors for the dividends so paid. On a bill
Dividends filed by a stockholder against the corporation to
restrain the payment of the dividend on the ground that it
had not been earned the Court of Chancery of New Jersey
holds in Schoenfeld v. American Can Co., 55 Atl. io44, that
relief will be denied where there is no showing that the direc-
tors are insolvent. There is, the court holds, an adequate
remedy at law under the statute. See Appleton v. American
Malting CO., 54 Aft. 454-
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).
The Supreme Court of California holds in People's Home
Saving Bank v. Rickard, 73 Pac. 858, that where, in an
Stock Sub. action to recover unpaid stock subscriptions on
scription: a call made to pay creditors after the corpora-
Transfer of tion's insolvency, the court found that defendant
Shares had transferred her stock to an insolvent for the
purpose of avoiding liability a finding that she was a stock-
holder at the date of the call was unnecessary to sustain a
judgment against her for the unpaid balance. In such action,
where it was shown that the defendant had transferred her
shares to an insolvent for the purpose of avoiding liability
and that such insolvent had transferred the stock to another,
the burden of proving that such subsequent transferee was
responsible, and that the defendant's liability was therefore
destroyed, was on her. See National, &c., Co. v. Storey &
Co., i i i Cal. 537, and Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 257.
DAMAGES.
In Watson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 45 S. E. 555, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina lays down the rule for
Death by determining the measure of damages for death
Negligence resulting from negligence. It is said to be as
follows:
" The measure of damages for loss of life of a decedent
is the present value of his net income, to be ascertained by
deducting the cost of his living and expenditure from his
gross income, and estimating the present value of the accumu-
lation from such net income based on his expectation of life;
and, in estimating the reasonable expectation of pecuniary
advantage from the continuation of decedent's life, his age,
habits, industry, skill, and reasonable expectation of life
should be considered; and the court may properly instruct
the jury that in ascertaining the present value of the net in-
come thev will first ascertain what one dollar, interest at six
per cent., will amount to for the time found the decedent
would have lived; that they will divide the net income by the
amount found one dollar and interest will amount to, which
amount will be the-answer to the issue as to what damages
plaintiff is entitled to recover."
See Benton v. R. R., 122 N. C. 1007.
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DAMAGES (Continued).
In Barette v. CUrl, 56 Atl. 93, the Supreme Court of Ver-
mont holds that in an action for an assault and battery
Assault: actual damages cannot be reduced by any evi-
Provocation dence of provocation that does not amount to a
legal justification. In such action, it is decided, the authority
of the court to set aside the verdict is not limited to excessive
verdicts, but the verdict may be set aside on the ground that
the damages are inadequate. "The authorities upon this
subject, says the Court, "are collected and reviewed in a
thorough note to Benton v. Collins, 47 L. R. A. 33, 39-"
DIVORCE.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in Lister v.
Lister, 55 Atl. 1093, that where a wife is justified in leaving
Crulty: her husband on account of his cruelty, the sepa-
Constructive ration is legally chargeable to the husbafild, and
Desertion constitutes a legal abandonment or desertion
upon his part. It is decided also that where a wife leaves her
husband, and seeks to establish constructive desertion by him
on account of cruelty, her testimony must be corroborated.
ESTOPPEL.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in O'Malley v.
[Fagner, 76 S. W. -56, that a mere payment by one of part
Payment of of a debt for which he is not legally bound, not
Part of Debt prejudicing anyone, does not estop him to deny
liability for the balance.
FEDERAL COURTS.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Cir-
cuit) decides in Schurmneier v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
State Co., 124 Fed. 865, that an action by a citizen of
Decisions another State against executors in Minnesota, to
enforce a claim against the estate of the decedent, cannot be
maintained in a Federal court after the time limited by the
state statute for presenting claims to the Probate Court for
allowance has expired, where the claim was not so presented,
and no excuse is alleged for the failure to present it. See in
connection with this case Griffn v. Overman Wheel Co., 9 C.
C. A. 548, and the notes thereto.
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GIFTS.
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Evans v. Evans,
45 S. E. 612, that where the husband is ignorant of the fact
Revocation that his wife has already committed adultery,and in compliance with her importunity makes to
her a gift of real or personal property, the sale may be re-
voked at his instance on his discovery of her previous crimi-
nal conduct. It is further decided that a like result will fol-
low if at the time of obtaining the gift the wife has in
contemplation subsequent adultery and elopement. Compare
Lister v. Lister, 35 N. J. Eq. 49.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
In Texas a husband is not permitted to be the agent of
his wife for the sale of her lands. The Court of Civil Ap-
. peals of Texas holds, therefore, in Louis v.
tions by Hoeldtke, 76 S. W. 30, that the wife is not
Husband bound by false statements and representations
made by her husband to induce a sale of such land.
Against the dissent of Chief Justice Parker, the Court of
Appeals of New York decides in Wanamaker v. Weaver, 68
WiWs N. E. 135, that where a husband furnishes his
Necessaries wife with necessaries suitable to her position, and
money with which to pay cash therefor, he is not liable for
the price of other goods, sold to her, in the absence of proof
of prior authority or subsequent ratification. See Debenham
v. Mellon, 6 App. Cas. 24, and the very recent decision in
Morel Bros. & Co. v. The Earl of Westmoreland, i K. B.
(19o3) 64.
The Appellate Court of Indiana (Division No. i) holds
in Robinson v. Foust, 68 N. E. 182, that a wife is no bound
Maintenance to use her separate personal property for the sup-
of Husband port of her husband, nor to use the same for the
payment of his funeral expenses and the expenses of his last
sickness.
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INSOLVENT DEBTORS.
With one judge dissenting, the Supreme Court of Ohio
holds in State Nat. Bank v. Esterly, 68 N. E. 582, that where
the property of an insolvent debtor, by order of
court, is placed in the hands of a receiver to be
administered upon for the payment of the insolvent's debts,
a creditor who holds collaterals taken to secure his claim, and
upon which he has realized before a dividend declared, is en-
titled to a dividend on only so much of his debt as remains
after deducting proceeds of the collateral; and this suni may
be ascertained at the time the dividend is declared, although
the claim had formerly been proven and allowed for the full
amount. See Bank v. Armstrong. 59 Fed. Rep. 372, 28 L.
R. A. 231.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
In Godfrey v. India Wharf Bre-wing Co., 84 N. Y. Supp.
9 o , it is held by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate
Covenant to Division, Second Department) that the measure
Repair: of damages in a lessee's action for breach of a
Damages covenant to repair is the difference between the
rental value of the premises as guaranteed and as they really
were, and anticipated profits from the business conducted
therein cannot be recovered.
The Appellate Court of Indiana (Division No. 2) holds
in La Plante v. La Zear, 68 N. E. 312, that the owner of a
Repairs building, with a single stairway leading thereto
for common use of the tenants, who leased it to
two tenants, was to be deemed as in possession of the stair-
way, and bound to keep it in repair, and was liable to a tenant
for an injury received by the tenant without his fault from
a defect in the stairwav. See in connection with this case a
very recent decision of the New York Supreme Court (Ap-
pellate Division, First Department) in Levine v.'Baldwin,
84 N. Y. Supp. 92.
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LEASE.
Where one of the essential considerations of a lease was
the adding of two stories by the lessee, without which he
Decision could not afford to pay the rent stipulated, and
the lessor honestly represented, and the lessee
believed, that the building would support the addition, but
when, after the execution of the lease, plans were drawn it
was discovered that such was not the case, the lessee was
entitled, in equity, to a rescission: Supreme Court of Illinois
in Barker v. Fitzgerald, 68 N. E. 43o .
LIMITATIONS.
The law of Iowa, similar to that of most, if not all, juris-
dictions, provides that the times limited for actions shall be
Tolling of extended in favor of insane persons, so that they
Statute: shall be permitted to sue within a reasonable time
Insanity after the termination of the disability. In Roe-
lefsen v. City of Pella, 96 N. W. 738, the Supreme Court of
Iowa holds that this statute applies only where the plaintiff
is insane when the cause of action accrued and not where
he becomes insane a few hours after the injury for which he
sues, though on the same day and as a result of the injury.
The court, even in the face of these unusual circumstances,
adheres to the general rule that where the statute has begun
to run it will be stopped by facts subsequently arising.
See Bishop v. Knowles, 53 Iowa 268.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The obligation of a master to exercise reasonable care to
provide his servants with reasonably safe instrumentalities
Negligenceof with which to perform their work embraces the
Master obligation to provide a sufficient number of ser-
vants to perform the work safely. Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in Peterson v. American Grass Twine Co., 96 N. NV.
913.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma holds in Kellogg v.
School Dist., 74 Pac. i io, that a resident tax-payer, although
Action by he shows no special private interest, may invoke
Tax-payer the interposition of a court of equity to prevent
an illegal disposition of the money of the municipality or the
illegal creation of a debt which he, in common with other
property owners, may otherwise be compelled to pay. See
Crampton v. Zabriskie, IIi U. S. 6o.
MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES.
One who has become a member of a benevolent order is
entitled to appeal to the courts for redress only after adopting
Rules: Right the procedure and exhausting the remedies pre-
of Action scribed by the constitution and by-laws of the
order, in case the regulations are not violative of the law.
Schou v. Sotoyomne Tribe, 73 Pac. 996.
NEGLIGENCE.
In an electric storm a man took refuge under the porch
of a store. He placed his back against an iron grating over
Duty to the window, and was subsequently killed by
t -sees lightning, which struck one of the defendant's
telephone poles near the store and was conducted to the porch
by a wire negligently maintained over the metal roof thereof.
and from the roof to the iron grating., and thence to this
person. Upon these facts the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
holds in Cumberland Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Martin's
Adm'il, 76 S. W. 394, that the deceased was a bare licensee
in the place where he was killed, and that defendant owed
him no duty to properly maintain the wire.
PROCEDURE.
In Helfrich v. Greenberg, 56 At]. 45, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that a rule of a court of common pleas
Affidavit of requiring executors, administrators, guardians,
Defence: committees, and others sued in a representative
Executors capacity to file affidavits of defence and direct-
ing judgment to be entered by default is valid. See Mfutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Tenan, 188 Pa. 239.
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-PROCESS.
In Greenleaf v. People's Bank of Buffalo, 45 S. E. 638,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that a managing
Privilege officer of a foreign corporation, who is in the
from Ser-,'ce state to attend to a sale of land under a decree
of the Federal court in an action in which the foreign cor-
poration is a party, is not in an attendance on a judicial pro-
ceeding so as to exempt him from service of a summons in
an action against the corporation. See Cooper v. Wyman,
122 N. C. 784.
RAILROADS.
The Supreme Court of North Carolifia decides in Hodges
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 S. E. 572, that where a deed
Right of Way to a railroad company granted a right of way
for Telegraph and easement for the purpose of " surveying,
Poles building, constructing, and repairing the road,"
the railroad acquired the right to erect and use, so far as
reasonably necessary for the operation of the road, a tele-
graph line, but was not authorized to erect and maintain a
line of telegraph poles and wires for general commercial pur-
poses. As a consequence of this it is held that a railroad
company which has cleared a right of way over certain land
by conveyance from the owner cannot grant a telegraph con-
pany such right cf way so as to enable it to maintain a line
for general commercial purposes.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided in Keck v.
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co., 56 Atl. 48, that where
EImployees a railroad employee is working on a train on the
Another track of another road. he accepts the risk of his
Railroad employment in regard to his own road, but not
those risks incident to the operation of the other road, unless
engaged at the time in work for such road or for both roads
jointly. The court discusses the effect of the Act of April,
1868, P. L. 58, which provides that any person who sustains
injury while engaged in railroad work about any train of the
company of which he is not an employee shall have the same
right of action as if he were an employee, but holds it inap-
plicable to the case of an engineer who is running a train
over the tracks of another company under permission given
to his employer to use such road. and is injured by the em-
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iNAILROADS (Continued).
ployees of the other company. Compare with this case the
very recent decision of Kclly v. Union Traction Company,
199 Pa. 322.
RECEIVERS.
In Townsend v. Onconta, &c., Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 427,
the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third
Certificates: Department) holds that a receiver of a railway
Authority corporation, the operating expenses of which
to Issue about equal its income, in the absence of any
expectation of a larger income in the future cannot be au-
thorized to issue certificates of indebtedness, constituting a
prior lien on all the property of the corporation, for the pur-
pose of paying past due interest on first mortgage bonds and
thereby preventing the bondholders from declaring the
bonds clue, as authorized by the mortgage, where the trustee
in the mortgage and the holders of the legal title to a
majority of the bonds object thereto.
RES JUDICATA.
WVith one judge dissenting, the Supreme Court of Utah
holds in State v. Mfortensen, 74 Pac. 120, that the decision
Motion for a of the Supreme Court on appeal from a judg-
New Trial ment denying a motion for a new trial based on
the ground of the misconduct of the jury is res judicata on
a subsequent application for a new trial based on the sarie
ground, though the affidavits supporting the second motion
show more in detail the misconduct complained of.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
In Jones v. Comer, 76 S. W. 392, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky holds that where a mother surrenders her child to
Part a third person under his agreement tG rear and
Performance educate him and pay him a certain sum at his
majority, the agreement, having been performed by her, can-
not be defeated because it was not reduced to writing or
to be performed within a year. Compare Benge r. Hiatt's
Administrator, 82 Ky. 667.
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Continued).
The fact that possession taken under a parol contract for
the salc of land is sufficient part performance of such con-
Part tract to avoid the operation of the statute of
Performance: frauds is, of course, well settled. In Pugh v.
Possession Spicknall, 73 Pac. 1020, the Supreme Court of
Oregon extends this principle and holds that the fact that
plaintiff's possession of the land antedated the parol agree-
ment was immaterial where the consideration of the contract
was the care and attention plaintiff was able to bestow on a
mother in consequence of her adjacent residence, and where
the improvements had not been made until after the agree-
ment was entered into.
In Alerding v. Alison, 68 N. E. 185, the Appellate Court
of Indiana (Division No. i) holds that a parol contract for
Promise of services to be paid for by a testamentary bequest
Bequest is within the statute of frauds.
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION.
A depositor in the savings fund of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company at the time of opening his account therein
Validity directed the company to pay to his wife, in the
event of his death, all deposits which should then
be standing to his credit in the fund. This the company
agreed to do. In Stevenson v. Earl, 55 At]. lo91, the Court
of Errors -and Appeals of New Jersey holds that the dis-
position thus made of the moneys remaining to the depositor's
credit at his death was testamentary in its character, and
was invalid because not made in the manner prescribed by
the statute of wills. The court declines to regard the trans-
action as a declaration of trust, relying upon the principle of
Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 13.
TRADE NAMES.
In Davenport Gas & Electric Co. v. Reiners, 96 N. W.
iO84, it appeared that the defendant, J. N. R., had been con-
Liability for ducting a business under the name of J. N. R.
Debts Printing Company. He subsequently leased the
business, and after such lease an indebtedness for light and
power was incurred by the lessee without notice to the
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TRADE NAMES (Continued).
creditor of the defendain's retirement. The Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that upon these facts, the defendant, having
permitted his name to be retained in the designation of the
company, is liable to the creditor.
TRUSTS.
In Jones v. Jones, 74 Pac. 143, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia holds that where a wife conveys land to her husband,
Constructive without consideration, for the purpose of a suit
Trusts: Re- for her benefit to oust the tenant-she being
conveyance advised that such conveyance is necessary for the
suit-a violation of the implied promise to re-convey consti-
tutes a constructive fraud, creating an involuntary trust in
her favor and entitling her to a re-conveyance. Compare
the case of Alaniz v. Casenave, 91 Cal. 41.
WATERCOURSES.
In Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N. V. io8o, the Supreme
Court of Iowa holds that a landowner who digged a well
Percolating obtaining a supply from percolating waters,
Water: thereby cutting off the supply of an adjoining
Injunction owner, must be enjoined from wasting the full
flow obtained by him for the mere purpose of injuring his
neighbor, the supply being more than adequate for both.
Compare the recent case of Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer,
93 N. W. 907, 6o L. R. A. 875.
WITNESSES.
The constitution of New York provides that one's opinions
or beliefs on religious subjects do not affect his capacity as a
Impeachment witness. Under this provision the Court of Ap-
peals of New York decides in Brink v. Stratton,
68 N. E. 148, that for the purpose of affecting the credibility
of a witness he cannot be interrogated as to his belief in the
existence of a Supreme Being who would punish him for
false swearing. See Gibson v. American AMutual Life In-
surance Co., 37 N. Y. 58o.
